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ICEBERG SEMANTICS FOR COUNT NOUNS AND MASS NOUNS: CLASSIFIERS, MEASURES AND PORTIONS
ABSTRACT: The background for this paper is the framework of Boolean semantics for mass and count nouns, and singular and plural count nouns, as developed from the work of Godehard Link in Link (1983) (see e.g. the expositions in Landman 1991 Landman , 2010 .
Link-style Boolean semantics for nouns (here called Mountain semantics) analyzes the oppositions mass-count and singularplural in terms of the notion of atomicity: counting is in terms of singular objects, which are taken to be atoms. Consequently, Link bases his semantics on two separate Boolean domains: a nonatomic mass domain and an atomic count domain. Singular count nouns are interpreted as sets of atoms, and semantic plurality is closure under sum, so plural objects are sums of atoms.
In this, sorted setup portions -like two portions of soup -are a puzzle: they are mass stuff -soup -, but count -two. But in order to be count they must be atoms. But they are not, because they are just soup. Mountain semantics can deal with portions, but at a cost.
In the first part of this paper I outline Iceberg semantics, an alternative to Mountain semantics within the general framework of Boolean semantics.
Iceberg semantics specifies a compositional mechanism which associates with the standard denotation of any noun phrase (here Iceberg Semantics 2 called the body) a base set, a set that generates the body under the sum operation ⊔. For count nouns, the base is the set in terms of which the members of the body are counted and to which distribution takes place. In Iceberg semantics, what allows counting to be correct is the requirement on the interpretations of count nouns that the base of their interpretation is (contextually) disjoint.
Already at this level we see two salient properties of Iceberg semantics:
-Atoms and atomicity play no role in the theory, so we can assume an unsorted interpretation domain for mass nouns and count nouns. In Iceberg semantics, mass and count can be seen as different perspectives on the same stuff (different bases for the same body). This means that we can do away with the extreme body-sorting and body-gridding that atomicity entails. With this we allow a simpler and more elegant analysis of mass-count interactions. For instance, portions can just be 'mass' stuff, evaluated relative to a count base.
-The mass-count distinction is formulated in terms of disjointness of the base. Iceberg semantics associates bases not just with the interpretations of lexical nouns, but with NPs in general and with DPs. This means that Iceberg semantics provides a compositional semantic theory of the mass-count distinction, and hence it provides a framework in which the mass-count nature of complex NPs and of DPs can be fruitfully studied.
It is the analysis of complex NPs and their mass-count properties that is the focus of the second part of this paper. There I develop an analysis of English and Dutch pseudo-partitives, in particular, measure phrases like three liters of wine and classifier phrases like three glasses of wine. We will study measure interpretations and classifier interpretations of measures and classifiers, and different types of classifier interpretations: container interpretations, contents interpretations, and -indeed -portion interpretations. Rothstein (2011) argues that classifier interpretations (including portion interpretations) of pseudo partitives pattern with count nouns, but that measure interpretations pattern with mass nouns. I will show that this distinction follows from the very basic architecture of Iceberg semantics.
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Correctness of counting:
If A ⊆ ATOM then *A itself has the structure of a complete atomic Boolean algebra with A as its set of atoms.
This property allows correct counting: every element in the count domain has a unique count, and no elements are skipped over. Thus, if you are a sum of three cats, you provably have as parts one sum of three cats (yourself), three sums of two cats, three single cats and the null object. A less attractive side-effect is that you don't have any other parts. Mountain semantics is forced into sorted domains with independent part-of relations. This means that there is basically no relation between the part-of order on the Boolean domain and intuitive lexical part-of relations: since Ronya is a (singular) cat, she is an atom in B; since her left front leg is a (singular) leg, it is an atom in B; and since her left front paw is a paw, it too is an atom in B. Thus these objects do not stand in a part-of relation that is internal to the Boolean theory. Similarly, the relation between objects and the mass stuff making them up is not internal: the stuff making up Ronya is not part of Ronya, since Ronya is an atom.
I accepted these conclusions cheerfully in Landman (1989 Landman ( , 1991 . But already in Landman (1991) I argued that this means that we must distinguish as distinct many 'flavors' of the same objects (like a mass version of a plural object, a sum version, a group version, etc.) and rely heavily on shifting between domains. The sorting problem is brought out sharply by the Problem of Portions. Portions are, what we could call, countable mass. Look at the examples in (1):
(1) a. The coffee in the pot and the coffee in the cup were each spiked with strychnine. b. I drank two cups of coffee. I didn't ingest the cups, so I drank two portions of coffee.
(1a), a variant of an example in Landman (1991) , shows that we can distribute with each to two items: the coffee in the pot and the coffee in www.thebalticyearbook.org Iceberg Semantics 6 the cup. Such distribution is indicative for count interpretations. The problem is that coffee is a mass noun, and hence its denotation is uncountable stuff. And coffee plus coffee is more coffee, more uncountable stuff. But then, how can we distribute in (1a)? Similarly in (1b), where we count two portions of coffee. Intuitively, a portion of coffee is coffee. And coffee plus coffee is more coffee. So how can we count two portions of coffee in (1b) if we only have stuff? In Landman (1991) I proposed, for examples like (1a), an operation that shifts mass objects to atoms in the count domain. This shifts makes mass entities countable. But that does mean that we are going to have in our domains distinct objects: Ronya (count), the stuff making up Ronya (mass), the latter mass stuff as a portion of cat stuff (count),. . . And it doesn't stop here.
I am not going to argue that this is a wrong approach (it can be made coherent, if complex). But it does seem a bit as if we are shoehorning portions into out sorted structures solely for the sake of atomicity: if we had a working theory in which counting doesn't depend on atomicity, we could hope to accept portions as both mass and countable. Welcome to Iceberg semantics.
Iceberg semantics
In Iceberg semantics nouns are interpreted as icebergs: they consist of a body and a base and the body is grounded in the base. For count nouns, the body looks just like what we assumed in Mountain semantics: the body of the Iceberg interpretation of plural noun cats is the closure under sum *CAT wt of the base of its interpretation CAT w,t , which is also the body (and base) of the interpretation of singular noun cat. So plural nouns are mountains rising up from bases. But the base is not a set of atoms, the elements of the base have parts within the Boolean domain B, so the base is, so to say, lifted from the bottom, and it floats.
This means, then, that the notion of singularity is loosened from the notion of atomicity. In fact, both the mass-count distinction and the singular-plural distinction will be defined for icebergs in relation to their base. This means that the same body will be mass or count depending on the base it is grounded in. It will also mean that the same body will be singular or plural depending on the base it is grounded in. The base forms a perspective on the body, the body itself is unsorted.
If we get rid of atomicity, how do we guarantee the correctness of counting, since in Mountain semantics it is the grounding of the denotation of plural nouns in the atomic denotations of singular nouns that gives plural nouns the correct counting structure? If we give up on atomicity, how can we guarantee the correct structure?
The answer is that in complete Boolean algebras it is not atomicity itself that guarantees correctness of counting, but a property that sets of atoms have, namely disjointness:
Correctness of counting:
If X is disjoint then *X has the structure of a complete atomic Boolean algebra with Z as its set of atoms.
Iceberg semantics takes this as its lead: it lifts the denotation of cat and cats off the atomic bottom (in fact, it no longer requires there to be an atomic bottom at all), and assumes that their denotations are grounded in a disjoint base.
Formally, we assume that NPs are interpreted as iceberg sets [i-sets]:
i-sets: An i-set is a pair consisting of a body set and a base set, with the body generated by the base under ⊔: X = < body(X), base(X) > with body(X), base(X) ⊆ B and body(X) ⊆ *base(X).
Iceberg semantics:
Singular noun cat and plural noun cats are counted in terms of the same disjoint base: cat → < CAT w,t , CAT w,t >, with CAT w,t a disjoint set. cats → <*CAT w,t , CAT w,t > Landman (2016) extends iceberg semantics for NPs to DPs. The extension is based on the notion of i-object: a pair <body, base>, with the body ∈ B, base ⊆ B and body = ⊔base. i-objects are count if their base is disjoint, singular if their base is a singleton. Thus the sum of the cats will count as a count object relative to its count base CAT w,t , but the same sum of cats will count as a mass object relative to, say, the set that contains the minimal identifiable cat-stuff:
www.thebalticyearbook.org Iceberg Semantics 8
The distinctions mass-count and neat-mess
The basic idea is the following. Let X be an i-set.
Mass -count i-sets: X is count iff base(X) is disjoint, otherwise X is mass.
Count nouns are interpreted as i-sets with a disjoint base, mass nouns as i-sets with an overlapping base. This is the basic idea, but we need to refine the analysis in order to deal with borderline situations. For example, we want to allow mass nouns to denote, relative to certain indices, the empty i-set <Ø,Ø> (i.e. indices where the denotation of mud is empty). But technically, <Ø, Ø> is count, since technically the empty set is disjoint. If we require mass nouns to be interpreted at every index as a mass i-set, we don't allow empty interpretations. On the other hand, we don't want the interpretations of mass nouns to be completely unconstrained.
We will allow mass noun α to denote count i-sets in situation that are borderline for α. I don't have a theory of what counts as borderline situations for mass nouns, but they will include situations where the denotation of mass noun gold is the empty set or a singleton set. Allowing these denotations in should not challenge the status of gold as a mass noun, as long as they are marked as special cases.
Mass-count NPs: Let α be an NP and w,t an index. w,t is α-normal if α w,t is not borderline for α. α is count iff for every index w,t: α w,t is count. α is mass iff for every α-normal index w,t: α w is mass. Presupposition: ceteris paribus, contextually relevant indices are α-normal.
This means that in all contexts we interpret count nouns as count i-sets, and in normal contexts we interpret mass nouns as mass i-sets. And we presuppose that when we interpret mass noun α in context, we can assume that the relevant indices are normal. Landman (2011) defines the notions of neat and mess, and proposes to use this distinction to characterize the difference between mass nouns like kitchenware (neat) and mass nouns like mud (mess). The notions below are changed a bit from Landman (2011):
Neat-mess i-sets: X is neat iff min(base(X)) is disjoint and min(base(X)) generates base(X) under ⊔, otherwise X is mess.
The intuition for neat mass nouns is that the distinction between singular and plural is not properly articulated in the base: min(base) ⊆ base ⊆ *min(base). Here too, the borderline case is the case where min(base) = base, which means that count should be borderline neat.
Neat-mess NPs: Let α be an NP and w,t an index. α is neat iff for every index w,t: α w,t is neat and at every α-normal index: α w,t is neat mass. α is mess iff for every α-normal index w,t: α w is mess mass.
This means then that neat mass nouns are neat in all contexts, and mass in normal contexts, and mess mass nouns are mess mass in all normal contexts.
As in Landman (2011) , both distinctions mass-count and neat-mess are grounded in the notions of disjointness and overlap. The present theory differs from Landman (2011) mainly in doing more justice to the idea that there are different ways in which denotations can turn www.thebalticyearbook.org Iceberg Semantics 10 out to be mess mass. In particular, Landman (2011) defined i-sets to be mess mass if min(base) overlaps. My present view is that that was an unnecessary stipulation: on the present definition an i-set will also come out as mess mass, if, say, the base itself is atomless, hence has no minimal elements.
[My aim in Landman (2011) was to shift the focus of mass nouns away from looking vertically (atomic versus atomless) to horizontal (disjointness versus overlap). However, once this shift is established, and atoms are made irrelevant in the theory, there is actually no reason to exclude atomless bases, and in fact, there is reason to allow them. I discuss the case of water in Landman (2011) , and suggest that water can be seen as a union of partitions of contextually minimal water parts, where a block of such a contextual partition may consist of one molecule of water and space around it, so the partition does not cut up water molecules, but it does cut up space. However, for a given contextual partition and a given block b, there are going to be alternative partitions where one of the blocks b' is the result of cutting off a bit of the space in b. Allowing both b and b' in the base brings us well on the way towards an atomless base.] Iceberg semantics proposes to use bases for distinguishing count nouns (disjoint base) from mass nouns. As discussed here and in Landman (2016) , for count nouns bases are used for counting, countcomparison, and distribution. I assume then that disjoint base is a grammatical property, a requirement on the semantics interpretation of count nouns. Except for the formulation in terms of bases, this is also what Rothstein (2011) proposes.
Rothstein moreover argues that it is important to interpret the grammatically relevant notion of disjointness as contextual disjointness. The denotations of nouns like fence and body part are not conceptually disjoint. But they are count nouns and that means that they are contextually coerced into disjointness by the disjoint base requirement on count nouns.
That disjointness is relevant for counting can be seen, for instance, by the bafflement of native speakers when you put a noun like body part, whose denotation is not conceptually disjoint, in a counting context that draws attention to the possibility of overlap:
Fingers on the buzzers and answer directly when you ring the bell: How many body parts does a Hippopotamus have?
This means that Iceberg semantics for count nouns assumes that there are contextual strategies for eliminating overlap. The simplest is contextual restriction: make sure that you choose your fences disjoint in a counting context. This was suggested in Rothstein (2010) . A more challenging operation, overlap elimination by doppelgänger, is discussed in Landman (2017) .[This operation allows us to replace in a counting context, for the sake of interpretation, in overlapping objects, say, roads x and y, the overlap, x ⊓ y, by disjoint objects, x x⊓y and y x⊓y , which are indistinguishable from x ⊓ y and each other.]
For mass nouns, bases are used for distinguishing neat mass nouns from mess mass nouns. Here too, for neat mass nouns, bases are used for count-comparison and distribution. And here too, the neat-mess distinction can be argued to be a grammatical distinction based similarly on contextual disjointness. For more discussion, see Landman 2017ms, 2016.)
Iceberg semantics for numerical modifiers
Counting requires a disjoint base. We formalize that by introducing a presuppositional notion of cardinality in Iceberg semantics:
Presuppositional cardinality:
The cardinality of x relative to Z is the cardinality of the set of Z-parts of x, presupposing that Z is disjoint.
We can use this notion to clarify the connection between count nouns and counting.
Counting and mass: Let α be a mass noun, and β an NP-modifier. If for all α-normal indices: β α w,t = ⊥, then β α is infelicitous.
Below we give a semantics for at least three α which involves the statement that card(base(α) ≥ 3. This is only going to be defined at an index w,t if base(α) is disjoint at w,t. at least three mud is infelicitous.
In this section, I discuss the semantics of numerical modifiers, mainly to set the stage for Part Two: the semantics of classifiers and measures. Landman (2016) contains discussion of other modifiers.
It is time to introduce the compositional mechanism of Iceberg semantics, and the central assumption (for English and Dutch) linking the syntax and semantics of complex NPs: the Head principle (for NPs):
Let H be an NP and C a complex NP with syntactic head H.
H and C denote i-sets: H = <body(H), base(H)> and C = <body(C), base(C)>.
Head principle for NPs: base(C) = (body(C)] ∩ base(H)
The head principle says that the base of the interpretation of the complex C is the set of all Boolean parts of the body of the interpretation of C, intersected with the base of the interpretation of the syntactic head H.
The head principle is the assumption that in the interpretation of headed complex NPs, the semantics passes base-information up from the head H to the complex NP. As we will see, we make this assumption both for modifier structures (adjuncts) and for complement structures (classifiers).
We follow the semantics for numerical modifiers proposed in Landman 2004. This means that we assume a category of number relation expressions, like at most, at least, exactly and -(null), which are interpreted as number relations:
at least → ≥ at most → ≤ exactly → = -→ = number relations. These expressions combine through application with number expression three -which denotes the number 3 -to form number predicates, denoting sets of numbers:
We derive numerical relations from number predicates by compositing the number predicate with card:
Hence, composition derives as the interpretation of at least three, the relation that holds between x and base set Z if the cardinality of x relative to Z is at least three. This is the analysis of Landman (2004) . We now need to cast this in the Iceberg semantics framework. We assume that numerical modifier phrases like at least three denote functions from i-sets to i-sets. This means that we need to turn the numerical relation into a function from i-sets to i-sets. We do that by the following schema:
Shift numerical relations to functions from i-sets to i-sets:
α a variable over numerical relations, P over i-sets -α here is a numerical relation like λXλx. card[x,X] ≥ 3. This relation inherits its presupposionality from card. This brings in the presupposition pres P,α on the interpretation of the numerical modifier, that the base of the interpretation of the head it modifies must be disjoint (so the head noun must be a count noun).
-base P,α is the base of the interpretation of the complex. This is determined by the Head principle. This is just the interpretation that you would get in Mountain semantics, except, of course, that cardinality is not defined in terms of atoms, but in terms of the disjoint base of the interpretation of the head.
Let us apply the interpretation for at least three to the interpretation of cats, <*CAT w,t , CAT w,t >, and to avoid issues of triviality, let us assume that CAT w,t is a disjoint set of at least three cats. Filling in all the details, we derive as the interpretation of at least three cats:
Given that the numerical modifier is purely quantitative (and our nontriviality assumption) ( body ] = *CAT w,t , hence: base = CAT w,t .
So if CAT w,t = { r(onya), e(mma), s(hunra), t(ijger) }, we derive for at least three cats: body = { r⊔e⊔s, r⊔e⊔t, r⊔s⊔t, e⊔s⊔t, r⊔e⊔s⊔t } a set of strict pluralities base = { r, e, s, t } Note that the base is not a subset of the body (but, of course, the body is generated by the base).
The analysis shows that we have achieved what we set out to achieve: we have given an Iceberg semantic analysis of numerical modifiers which counts sums in the body of the interpretation of cats in terms of the elements in the base of the interpretation of cats.
The base is also used for the other hallmark of the count domain: distribution, for example with count distributor each. In (3), a sum of cats in the denotation of three pet cats counts as a sum of three in relation to the base of the interpretation of the subject three pet cats, which is PET w,t ∩ CAT w,t (see Landman 2016 for Iceberg semantics for such modifiers).
(3)
Three pet cats should each have their own basket.
Each in the VP distributes the VP property to the elements of this set: (3) expresses that if in your house there is a sum x of three pet cats, the parts of x that are in PET w,t ∩ CAT w,t should have their own basket.
CLASSIFIERS, MEASURES AND PORTIONS

Head principle for NPs: base(C) = (body(C)] ∩ base(H)
The base of C is the part set of the body of C intersected with the base of H.
In the previous section we illustrated the head principle in the case of numerical modifiers. We are now concerned with the following consequence of the principle:
This means that we should find the following mass-count properties for complex nouns:
Corollary: Mass-count
The mass-count characteristics of the head inherit up to the complex: Complex noun phrases are count if the head is count. Complex noun phrases are mass if the head is mass.
We explore this in the context of classifier and measure phrases.
Classifiers and measures in English and Dutch
Classifiers and measures are pseudo-partitives in English, they take element of, which is neither a preposition, nor a partitive marker, and in fact, a similar marker is absent in Dutch (as shown in (4a)); they take mass or plural NPs as complements, but not singular NPs (as shown in (4b)); classifiers and measures agree in number with numerical modifiers in English, and so do classifiers in Dutch (as shown in (4c) You need one pound of sugar. That one pound of sugar will be used up completely.
Most remarkable from a semantic point of view is the cheerful shifting between measure and classifier interpretations (as in (7) and (8) Rothstein (2011) proposes (following, among others, Landman (2004)) semantic interpretations for classifier phrases and measure phrases along the following lines:
Classifier interpretation: three glasses of wine → three ∩ (glass(wine)) glass applies to wine; three intersects with the result.
On the classifier interpretation, the semantic head is the classifier glass. This will derive classifier interpretations like the following:
three glasses of wine = three glasses filled with wine These interpretations are container classifier interpretations. We will discuss other classifier interpretations below, but they will follow the same semantic composition.
Measure interpretation: three liters of wine → (three • liter) ∩ wine three composes with liter; the result intersects with wine.
On the measure interpretation, the semantic head is the non-measure wine. This will derive measure interpretations like the following:
three liters of wine = wine to the amount of three liters three boxes of books = books to the amount of three boxfuls
The Iceberg semantics for classifiers and measures that I will develop here will follow these semantic derivations. Rothstein (2011, in press) (9b) is infelicitous. I want to place the data in (9) in a wider context. Look at classifier example (9c), again in a natural situation where it is not the cup that is melted: (9) c. #Twee gesmolten bekers ijs. #Two melted cups of icecream.
The observation is that (9c) also seems infelicitous if it is only the icecream that is melted. If so, the semantics apparently cannot derive melted(cups(icecream)) with interpretation: cups( melted(icecream) ), i.e. skipping over, so to say, the cups. (The difference with (9a) is that in (9a) the natural interpretation does not skip over the cups: it is the "cup cum icecream experience" that you pay for in a certain kind of restaurant.) But this is directly relevant for the example (9b): if we cannot get the skip-over interpretation in classifier derivations, we surely would not expect to be able to get a hop-skip-jump interpretation (two
The conclusion is that the measure semantics that is shared between Rothstein and me all by itself accounts for the differences observed in (9), without making any assumptions about the syntax.
But there is another point to be made. While [γ]-searching for variants of the expression (9b) and (9c) Since the examples in (10) involve measures, and (10b,c) clearly measure interpretations, these examples should be ungrammatical on Rothstein's analysis, which seems rather harsh. On my analysis, such examples are not ungrammatical, and the examples in (10) can be accommodated as follows. Classifiers, measures, and adjectival modifiers all have interpretations (basically) as functions from i-sets to i-sets. This means, technically, that there could be another derivation possibility: compose the classifier/measure with the adjective, and then follow the derivation as usual. And this, when worked out properly, generates exactly the skip-over reading:
My suggestion is that interpreting the adjective via composition with the classifier/measure is not an operation that is readily available, and it may be indeed strictly unavailable for speakers who don't accept cases like (10) at all (like Susan Rothstein). But, the suggestion is that, for others, applying this composition is an option that is in some contexts available, and it makes skip-over interpretations possible.
So the evidence from adjectives does not point at the need to assume the measure syntax, and in fact the measure syntax may be a bother more than a boon, which means that ceteris paribus, I'd rather not assume that structure. Now, we have already seen above in (6) that gender agreement in Dutch is always with the classifier or the measure, never with NP[-plur]. I do not have the space to discuss the complexities of numberagreement here, but I argue in Landman (2017) that the situation is in essence similar: the facts do not justify the assumption that in phrases with a measure interpretation NP [-plur] is the syntactic head. Rothstein's measure structure gives NPs with a measure phrase, like at least three liters of wine, the same structure as NPs with numerical modifiers, like at least three boys, that is, a modifier structure. Given the syntactic differences observed, this requires a syntactic theory in which the same modification geometry is input to two very different agreement mechanisms. To me this seems once again more a bother than a boon, and ceteris paribus, I'd rather not assume that structure.
My attitude towards Rothstein's third assumption, the systematic reinterpretation of plural NP[-sing] as a mass noun, is similar, though for different reasons. Note first that the reinterpretation involves a shift from the plural noun to a neat mass noun, which is, in Rothstein's theory, a very minimal shift from a count set of object-context pairs to the corresponding set of objects, which is neat mass. So the shift is not grinding, which is shifting to a mess mass interpretation. This is important, since there is no evidence for obligatory reinterpretation of plural count nouns as mess mass nouns in this context. Look at example (11): (11) The truck toppled over and five hundred boxes of ball bearings were rolling over the highway, causing a major traffic jam.
This example is nicely ambiguous between a classifier interpretation, where it is five hundred boxes that rolled over the highway, and a measure interpretation, where it is ball bearings to the amount of 500 boxfuls that rolled over the highway. But it is precisely on the measure interpretation that it is ball bearings rolling over the highway. There is no natural sense in which that interpretation involves by necessity a reinterpretation of ball bearings as a mess mass noun, ball bearing mess. But the assumption that the reinterpretation involved is the minimal type readjustment of the plural count noun to a neat mass noun brings in a puzzle. As is well-known, the italicized context in (12) is a context where, in English, bare singular count nouns cannot naturally occur:
The Thai restaurant was advertised as the award winning restaurant from two consecutive years, so we decided to try Thai food for the first time in our lives. But now we have a puzzle in English: the minimal shift from the count noun to the neat mass noun that Rothstein postulates in measure phrases would resolve the grammatical mismatch in (12) much more efficiently than grinding, and it would get the same interpretation for (12) as in Mandarin, an interpretation that is not available in English.
Clearly, then, shifting from count noun interpretations to neat noun interpretations is available in English only under very restricted circumstances that do not include cases like (12). Now, I can come up with a story myself for why this would be so (say, based on competition), but I have the option here to choose the simpler solution: the shift to neat mass noun interpretations doesn't happen, because it doesn't exist.
In this paper, then, I will make the following alternative assumptions:
1. Measure phrases have the classifier structure and a measure interpretation. So there is a mismatch between syntax and semantics. 2. The syntactic head of the measure phrase is the measure. 3. Semantically, the measure itself is mass.
If the measure is mass and the measure is the head of the measure construction, then, by the Head principle, the measure phrase itself comes out as mass. This means that we will be able to derive, with a standard syntax, the result about measure phrases that Rothstein's reinterpretation stipulation was concerned with. We will focus on deriving the semantics of classifier phrase glass of wine, and assume that semantic pluralization and modification with three takes place on the classifier interpretation derived.
Semantics of classifiers
We start out with mass noun wine and count noun glass, with interpretations:
noun: wine → WINE w,t = <WINE w,t , base(WINE w,t )> noun: glass → GLASS w,t = <GLASS w,t , GLASS w,t >, with GLASS w,t disjoint.
We assume that the noun glass becomes a classifier glass, and this involves shifting its interpretation from an i-set to a function from i-sets to i-sets:
Classifier: glass → classifier[GLASS w,t ] a function from i-sets to i-sets It will be useful here to specify a general schema for the interpretation of classifiers, so that below, when we are concerned with different classifier interpretations, we only need to specify the variable parameters for the different interpretations.
General classifier interpretation schema: [Let P be a variable over i-sets, α a count i-set] www.thebalticyearbook.org Iceberg Semantics 24 pres P specifies potential further presuppositions (we see this below in the discussion of contents classifiers). Apart from that, the schema tells us that, if the base of the noun that the classifier is based on is given, we only need to specify body P .
Given all this, we will give a semantics for container classifiers and various types of portion classifiers, in particular, shape classifiers and contents classifiers.
Semantics of container classifiers
The first classifier interpretation we are concerned with is the container interpretation:
three glasses of wine = three glasses filled with wine
In the classifier interpretation schema α = <GLASS w,t , GLASS w,t >. We specify body P :
Container interpretation: body P = λx.GLASS w,t (x) ∧ body(P)(contents [GLASS, P,c],w,t (x)) The set of glasses containing body(P)
The basis of the container interpretation is the function contents.
contents [GLASS, WINE,c],w,t : B → B ∪ ⊥
The contents function specifies for a container at an index its relevant contents: the relevant stuff that is in the container. The function is constrained by a further parameter sequence:
This parameter sequence is used to impose constraints on contents. For instance, an obvious constraint is:
Containers and contents: contents [GLASS, WINE,c],w,t (x) = y presupposes that x is a glass and requires that y is wine.
There are all sorts of other constraints on relevant contexts: -For glasses and wine, contents concerns liquid contents and not the gaseous contents, i.e. we ignore the air hovering above the wine inside the glass. -contents requires the amount of wine in the glass to be within a certain range.
Look at (13): What counts changes when we vary the parameters: the same amount of single malt as in (13) in a scotch glass may well count as a glass of Lagavulin. The same amount of wine as in (13) in the same wine glass would have counted as a glass of wine when Susan was pregnant.
-The wine may be mixed with non-wine but only to a certain extent. In classical Greece wine was always drunk mixed with water, some drinks naturally allow water, some an olive, a piece of lemon, a grape pit,. . . without affecting the contents. Thus, it is still a glass of mescal, even if it has a worm in it. But not every additive can be ignored: if you pour diesel oil in my glass of Chassagne Montrachet, it is no longer a glass of wine (and also the end of a beautiful friendship).
We continue with the semantic derivation. body P = λx.GLASS w,t (x) ∧ body(P)(contents w,t (x)) base P = ( body P ] ∩ GLASS w,t = body P We apply to the i-set interpretation of wine and get:
[NP glass of wine ] → <base, base> base = λx.GLASS w,t (x) ∧ WINE w,t (contents w,t (x)) The set of glasses that contain wine. Now we observe: glass is a count noun, hence GLASS w,t is disjoint. That means that the base of the container interpretation of glass of wine is disjoint, and we have derived:
Fact: glass of wine, with glass a container classifier, is a singular count NP.
Portion and measures interpretations
Before we analyze portion readings and measure readings, we establish the basic distinction that the semantics will have to support. We just derived that container classifier readings are count readings. We will see that portion classifier readings, even though they may well concern mass stuff, pattern with count nouns, so portion readings also ought to come out as count. We show, following Rothstein (2011) , that measure readings pattern with mass nouns.
Portion classifiers interpretations are count
So far we have followed Rothstein (2011) and distinguished container classifier readings from measure readings. We add to that now portion readings:
Three glasses of wine: container reading three glasses containing wine measure reading wine to the amount of three glassfuls portion reading three wine portions each of which is the contents of a glass of wine We find the portion reading for sixteen glasses of wine in (13): (14) I have put sixteen glasses of wine ready in a row, of different sizes, as you can see. We are going to put all of it into the brew in the course of two hours. As you will see, most of the sixteen glasses of wine are put into the soup during the first half an hour of brewing.
First note that the container reading is not relevant: we are not going to put the glasses in the brew. Note secondly that the measure reading is not relevant either: the glasses are specified as being of different sizes. The essence of the measure reading is that glass as a measure is interpreted as glassful, an amount that may be contextually given, but is fixed. This is irrelevant in (14), because what we pour in at different times is indeed wine, but not glassfuls of wine, not every time the same fixed amount. Thus we have a true portion reading in (14): we pour into the brew wine in portions of different size. Now look at the interpretation of most in (14). Most in (14) involves a comparison in terms of the number of portions of wine, not in terms of the amount of wine (i.e. if during the first half an hour we pour into the brew the contents of 12 scotch glasses, and during the remainder one and a half hour the contents of 4 half-liter beer glasses, (14) is true). This means that the portion reading is a count reading.
So indeed, portion readings are readings that denote stuff, like mass nouns, but are count. Other portion classifiers are shape classifiers like hunk, slice, stack (of hay), strand (of hair):
A hunk of meat = meat in the shape of a hunk A slice of meat = meat in the shape of a slice As in (14), most in (15c) makes a comparison in terms of the number of slices of meat, not in terms of the weight or volume of the meat. Partee & Borschev (2012) discuss portion readings (tentatively) as a subcase of measure readings. Schvarcz (2014) argues with Hungarian data that portion readings are count. Khrizman et al. (2015) argue that portion readings differ systematically from measure readings, and they offer cross-linguistic evidence to this effect. I present some of the cases discussed in Khrizman et al. (2015) in section 2.7.
Measure interpretations are mass
I start with a preamble about partitives. Partitives with singular count DPs like of the cat pattern with partitives with mass DPs like of the wine much of the cat / #one of the cat Landman (2017) argues that if we assume that the semantics of the partitive disallows singular i-objects as the partitive complement, then partitives with singular count DPs can only be felicitous by shifting the singular count object (e.g. <ronya,ronya>) to a mass object (e.g. <ronya,mass-base>). On the analysis given in Landman (2017) -(19a) and (20a) are completely out, because much and het meeste select for mass nouns. -(19b) and (20b) We see the same contrast in (21) (based on examples from Rothstein 2011): (21) a. Many of the twenty kilos of potatoes that we sampled at the food show were prepared in special ways. b. Much of the three kilos of potatoes that I ate had a pleasant taste.
-(21a) has a portion interpretation. We went with a group to the food show, and in each booth they served us a kilo-size portion of potatoes.
In quite a number of these booths they had made an effort to prepare the potatoes in a special way.
-(21b) has a measure interpretation. I ate a three kilo-size portion of potatoes: it consisted of four very big potatoes, and 10 tiny blue-green ones. The latter tasted, well, peculiar. Actually, note that (21b) can be used to express that individual potatoes had a pleasant taste: it is not required that potatoes itself shifts to mass.
Rothstein's example (22) is also instructive: (22) a. #Each of the six boxes of books that I read had more than 300 pages. b.
Much of the six boxes of books that I brought could have stayed at home.
The VP in (22) forces reference to books rather than boxes, since boxes don't have pages. Only a measure interpretation accesses books, since portions of books don't have pages either. Each is incompatible with the measure reading, so (22a) is infelicitous. But (22b) is perfectly fine, and has a measure interpretation whereby the totality books is compared in terms of the measure boxful.
What this means is that 'the very same thing' may count as much of the six boxes of ball bearings, which is mass, and as many of the ball bearings, which is count. In Iceberg semantics, the difference is located in the base: the base of the first, but not that of the second involves the measure boxful in its derivation.
Semantics of portion classifiers
Shape classifiers
The Iceberg semantics of shape classifiers like hunk, slice, heap, strand,. . . is straightforward. Shape classifiers are portion classifiers based on count nouns. As functions from i-sets to i-sets the semantics expressed by their body is just intersection: count noun: hunk → <HUNK w,t , HUNK w,t >, with HUNK w,t disjoint.
Shape classifier interpretation:
The stuff that is body(P) and hunk.
We feed the portion interpretation for hunk into the classifier interpretation schema of section 2.2, apply to the interpretation of meat, and derive (after simplification):
The stuff that is meat and hunk.
Since shape classifiers are based on count nouns, the base derived for hunk of meat is disjoint, so we derive for shape classifiers the same fact as for container classifiers:
fact: hunk of meat with hunk a shape portion classifier is a singular count NP.
Actually, shape classifiers satisfy a stronger property:
Contextual separateness:
If HUNK w,t (x) and HUNK w,t (y) and x = y, then x and y are contextually separated: What I mean by this is that two disjoint parts of one hunk of meat only become themselves hunks when they are cut and we can pick them up separately. Similarly, two disjoint parts of the soup become portions of soup when we put them in separate bowls. And two segments of one hair are not two strands of hair, strands of hair are hairs, complete objects. Defining the notion of contextual separation goes beyond the scope of this paper. It relates to the topological considerations in the semantics of mass and count nouns in Grimm (2012) (though separatedness is more than topological apartness: two slices of meat lying op top of each other are separate slices, but not topologically apart).
Contents classifiers
Above, we analyzed the container reading of three glasses of wine: three glasses containing wine. In this section we are concerned with the contents reading: wine contained in three glasses. This reading is a portion reading, which, as is clear from this informal description, involves the converse of the containment relation (to be defined with the contents function). Central in the analysis of contents readings is a presupposition that the function contents is normal on relevant indices w,t, in the following sense:
Normality of contents: content [GLASS,WINE,c] is normal on w,t iff if GLASS w,t (x) and GLASS w,t (y) and x = y then content [GLASS,WINE,c]w,t (x) and content [GLASS,WINE,c]w,t (y) are disjoint.
A consequence of normality is that in normal contexts the function contents w,t is one-one, and hence the inverse function contents w,t -1 is defined.
In section 2.3 the container classifier interpretation of glass was derived directly from the interpretation of the noun glass. For the contents interpretation, we shift the interpretation of the noun glass from a set of containers to the set of portions that are the contents of those containers:
Contents interpretation of NP glass:
[NP glass ] → <base, base> base = λx.GLASS w,t (contents w,t -1 (x)) The set of portions that are contents in w,t of glasses.
It is this NP-interpretation of glass that enters into the classifier interpretation schema. As promised above, for contents classifiers we specify an additional presupposition on the classifier interpretation schema:
pres P = contents is normal on the context. Under this presupposition, the schema derives the following body:
Contents classifier interpretation: body P = λx. body(P)(x) ∧ GLASS w,t (contents w,t -1 (x)) The set of body(P) portions that are contents in w,t of glasses.
We apply to the interpretation of wine and derive:
glass of wine → <base, base> base = λx.WINE w,t (x) ∧ GLASS w,t (contents w,t -1 (x)) The set of wine portions that are glass-contents in w,t. Now we argue as follows. Let x, y ∈ base and let x = y. Then contents w,t -1 (x) = contents w,t -1 (y), simply because contents w,t is a function. So x and y are the contents in w,t of different glasses. It follows now from the normality presupposition that portions of wine x and y are disjoint. Hence we have derived, also for contents portion classifiers: Fact: glass of wine, with glass a contents portion classifier is a singular count NP. Measure functions are functions from B into the set of non-negative real numbers (R + ), where the null-object in B is mapped onto 0. In general:
Measure functions: µ w,t : B → R + ∪ {⊥} where µ w,t (0) = 0
In the context of natural language measures we cannot ignore the possibility that objects with defined measure values have parts whose measure value is not defined. For instance, the measure broadloom meter measures the length of carpet with a standard width of 3.66 meter. A role of carpet has a defined broadloom meter value, but this value is measured along one side of the roll, hence, only parts that go from that side across the roll have themselves a defined broadloom meter values. I will be concerned here with additive continuous measure functions, like the measure functions for volume and weight. Additivity is the following principles:
Additivity:
If X is a countable disjoint subset of B and for every x ∈ X: def(µ w,t (x)), then µ w,t (⊔X) = Σ(µ w,t (x): x ∈ X} This entails, for x and y such that def(µ w,t (x -y)), def(µ w,t (y -x)) and def(µ w,t (x ⊓ y)):
I will presuppose a standard definition of continuity for measure functions, which entails the Intermediate Value Theorem:
Intermediate Value Theorem: If x ⊑ y and µ w,t (x) < µ w,t (y) then for every r ∈ R + : if µ w,t (x) < r < µ w,t (y) then ∃z ∈ B: x ⊑ z ⊑ y and µ w,t (z) = r Take volume as an example: continuity entails that when a body grows from x with defined volume µ w,t (x) to y with defined volume µ w,t (y), its volume passes through all intermediate values. The intermediate value theorem tells us that we do not let undefinedness interfere with continuity. Take once again the measure broadloom meter: when we measure the carpet roll along the defined dimension, the measure values increase through all real numbers from 0 to the broadloom value of the carpet roll: we do not go through undefined values when we measure parts of the roll along this dimension.
Measure i-sets: additive continuous measures are mass
A measure function µ w,t is, of course, a set of pairs of objects in B and values in B + ∪ {⊥}:
I propose to use this view of the measure function as a set of pairs to extend Iceberg semantics to measures: we generalize the notion i-set to measure i-set:
measure i-sets: Given measure function µ wt . A (µ wt ) measure i-set is a pair <body, base>, where body and base are sets of object-µ w,t value pairs, and the base generates the body under sum.
The notion generated under sum means that we need to impose a Boolean structure onto the set of pairs of object-measure values. Since every object in B has a value under µ w,t in R + ∪ {⊥}, lifting the Boolean structure from B to µ w,t is lifting the structure in a trivial way to D × (R + ∪ {⊥}):
The Boolean algebra B µ,w,t is clearly isomorphic to B (since the measure part plays no role in the definitions). We now interpret measure liter as a measure i-set, with body the additive continuous volume measure function liter w,t :
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[ measure liter ] → LITER w,t = <body(LITER w,t ), base(LITER w,t )> with:
1.body(LITER w,t ) = liter w,t 2. base(liter w,t ) ⊆ liter w,t and base(liter w,t ) generates liter w,t under ⊔ Bµ,w,t We now argue:
Fact: If µ w,t is an additive continuous measure function, < µ w,t , base> is a measure i-set, and the base is disjoint, then the base can only contain pairs of the form <x,0> or <x,⊥> Proof: Let µ w,t be an additive continuous measure function, < µ w,t , base> a measure i-set, base disjoint and µ w,t (x) > 0 and <x,µ w,t (x)> ∈ base. Then 0 ⊑ x and µ w,t (0) < µ w,t (x). Let 0 < r < µ w,t (x). By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a y such that 0 ⊑ y ⊑ x and µ w,t (y) = r. Then <y, µ w,t (y)> is generated by base, i.e. µ w,t (y) ∈ *base. But obviously, since y is a proper part of x, <y, µ w,t (y)> can only be generated from pairs <z, µ w,t (z)> ∈ base, with z a proper part of x. This means that base is not disjoint. Hence, if base cannot it cannot contain pairs of the form <x,r>, with r >0.
Does this show that the base of additive continuous measures cannot be disjoint? Not quite by itself, because the theory does not disallow infinitesimal point objects.
Think of models for space and time. As is well know, we can represent real time intervals and real space solids as infinite sets of point, regular open sets of points. If we include the points in our model they are disjoint, and in defining measure functions for space and time we set the measure values of the points to 0 (or ⊥). Regular open sets of points get positive real measure values. If we generalize this picture from space to matter, and allow infinitesimal disjoint matter points, we could let the bases consist of matter points and generate all measure values from a disjoint base of points.
But note, these would not be points of time, space or space-time, but points of matter, which can be seen as an extreme version of Demokritos' theory of atoms. Such points of matter have, of course, no physical reality: while space may be made up of space points, I will not accept that similarly wine is made up of wine points. This really is an extension of the arguments in Landman (2011) against 'homeopathic semantics': salt worth one salt molecule is mass noun phrase. Iceberg semantics does not accept that, because of the mass nature of the noun phrase, the objects in its denotation must split into proper parts that are themselves in the denotation of salt (i.e. that it is salt all the way down). Similarly, Iceberg semantics does not accept that salt is built from salt-points:
Iceberg semantics: Try to develop the semantics of mass nouns and count nouns in naturalistic structures. Try not to disregard natural parts and structure. Try not to include non-natural. structure.
[Note: This semantic naturalism does not, in my view, extend to fundamental ontological notions of when an object counts as 'one', where an object begins and ends, etc. I argued already in Landman (1992) for events that, as far as grammar is concerned, the latter notions are contextual and pragmatically manipulated, so naturalistic parsimony is not necessarily appropriate there. I will discuss these matters in the context of the semantics of mass and count nouns in Landman (2017), projected.] So I add to the technical theory an Icebergian axiom of faith:
Iceberg Dogma: Iceberg semantics rejects points of matter.
With this we conclude:
Corollary: Continuous additive measures are interpreted as mess mass measure i-sets: measure i-sets with an overlapping base. In other words: measures are mass.
So what is base(LITER w,t )? Intuitively, in Iceberg semantics the base contains the 'contextually minimal' stuff that the body is made of. The above discussion suggests that for measure functions, the generating base must be a set that is closed under parts. Since measures are extensional, it is natural to think of the base as the set of all part-measure value pairs whose measure value is smaller than a certain value.
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liter w,t ≤m = {<x, liter w,t (x)>: liter w,t (x) ≤ m } The set of object-liter value pairs where the liter value is less than or equal to m.
We set:
[ measure liter ] → < liter w,t , liter w,t ≤m > liter w,t ≤m is closed downward and hence a heavily overlapping base. Since all pairs <d, liter w,t > with liter w,t (d) ≤ m are in liter w,t ≤m , liter w,t ≤m has no problem generating all elements with higher volume value as sums of base elements with ⊔ B,literw,t : liter w,t ⊆ *liter w,t ≤m . I summarize where we are. I made the standard assumption that measure liter denotes an additive continuous measure function. I have implemented this in the most literal way in Iceberg semantics: measure liter denotes a measure i-set: it satisfies the same requirement of the body being generated under sum from the base as all other nominal expressions. I derived from that and from general concerns about additive measure functions that measures are mass.
The general measure interpretation schema
We add operations ↑ and ↓ that shift between sets of objects and sets of object-measure value pairs in the obvious way:
For X ⊆ B:
↑ X = {<x,liter w,t (x)>: x ∈ X } For Z ⊆ B liter. w,t : ↓ Z = {x ∈ B: <x, liter w,t (x)> ∈ Z} Further, as a last step on the way to the general measure interpretation schema, it will be useful to introduce a mixed type of i-set, with the body a set of objects, and the base a set of object-µ wt value pairs: measure i ↓ -sets:
Given measure function µ w.t . A (µ w.t ) measure i ↓ -set is a pair <body, base>, where the body is a set of objects and the base is a set of object-µ wt value pairs and ↓ base generates the body under ⊔.
What will happen is the following. The measure liter denotes a measure i-set, body and base are pairs of objects-liter w,t values. The measure phrase three liters of wine will denote a measure i ↓ -set: the body denotes a set of objects, but the base still denotes a set of objectliter w,t values. This assumption allows us to keep track of the relevant part of the measure function in the derivation, up to the level where, say, in the partitive measure phrases of section 2.4.2 like much of the twenty kilos of potatoes, we want much to access the measure function.
I assume a syntax and semantics for measure phrases along the following lines: We have so far interpreted measure liter as LITER w,t , a measure i-set. But this measure i-set needs to shift to a function, measure(LITER w,t ), which can fulfil the grammatical functions: it should compose with the interpretation of number predicate three, and intersect the result with the interpretation of wine.
Given what was said above, we assume: measure(α) shifts measure i-set α to a function from number sets and measure i-sets to measure i ↓ -sets.
General measure interpretation schema:
[Let P be a variable over i-sets N over sets of numbers, α a measure i-set.]
[I have left potential further presuppositions out of the schema for simplicity.]
We apply the general measure schema to measure liter, number predicate three, and NP[-plur] wine, and we derive: three liters of wine → <body, base> body = λx.liter w,t (x)=3 ∧ WINE w,t (x) The wine that has volume three liters. base = {<y, liter w,t (y)>:
The stuff that is part of the wine and has volume at most m.
We derive the following fact:
Fact: Measure phrase three liters of wine is a mass NP. The shift Ah, just squeeze enough into the box so that it weighs exactly 500 grams would be a faux pas at this particular location. Khrizman et al. (2015) , in their discussion of the count nature of portion interpretation, discuss various operations that shift measures to portion classifiers, and argue that the interpretations derived are count. I will briefly sketch these shifts here.
Shifting measures to classifiers
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In all the following cases we derive λP.<base P ,base P >, with base P disjoint.
Case 1: Shift the measure to a container interpretation.
This is what we saw in example (7) and what we see in example (24): (24) I broke a liter of milk
We assume property CONTAINER c that maps index w,t onto disjoint set CONTAINER c,w,t , a set of containers at w,t whose nature is determined by context c. We shift measure LITER w,t to singular count i-set one liter container which feeds into the classifier interpretation schema. The compositional details are given in Khrizman et al. (2015) . We derive the following base:
The set of containers containing one liter of body(P). This is, of course a disjoint set (because CONTAINER c,w,t is disjoint).
liter of milk → <base, base> base = λx.CONTAINER c,w,t (x) ∧ MILK w,t (contents w,t (x)) ∧ liter w,t (contents w,t (x))=1
With this, (24) expresses that I broke a one liter container of milk.
Case 2. Shift the measure to a portion interpretation: free portion interpretations.
This is what we find in (25):
(25) He drank three liters of Soda pop, one in the morning, one in the afternoon, one in the evening.
Here the protagonist drank three portions of Soda pop, of one liter each. In analogy to the previous case, we assume a property PORTION c that maps index w,t onto disjoint set PORTION c,w,t , a set of portions at w,t whose nature is determined by context c. We shift measure LITER w,t to singular count i-set one liter portion, which feeds into the classifier interpretation schema. The compositional details are the same as for container shift. We derive the following base:
The set of one liter portions of body(P).
Again this is disjoint set (because PORTION c,w,t is disjoint).
With this, (25) expresses that he drank three disjoint one liter portions of soda pop.
Case 3: Free portions interpretations for container classifiers
We have seen above that container classifiers like bottle, glass, cup, box can have measure interpretations. We assume that these interpretations involve non-standard measure functions: bottle w,t , glass w,t , cup w,t , box w,t . The measure function cupw,t fixes a volume that count as the contents of 'one cup' (US: 1 cup = 0.236588 liters [γ]). Now, under case 2 we shifted standard measure liter to a portion classifier. With that we may well expect that we can, with the same operation, shift the non-standard measure interpretation of container classifiers to portion classifiers as well: Thus as a measure, cup is interpreted as a measure i-set based on measure function cup w,t . With the portion shift operation of case 2, we shift this to portion classifier one cup portion. We derive the following base:
The set of one-cup size portions of body(P) 
Pour three cups of soy sauce in the brew, the first after 5 minutes, the second after 10 minutes, the third after 15 minutes. I have a good eye and a very steady hand, so I pour them straight from the bottle.
As usual, the relevant reading of three cups of soy sauce in (26) is not a container classifier reading: I don't add the cups to the brew. The relevant reading is not a contents classifier reading either: the soy sauce is never in a cup when I pour, the portions of soy sauce in question are not the contents of any container in CUP w,t . The reading is not a measure reading either, because I count what I pour in: one cup-size portions. This is the free portions interpretation: portions that are tied to the measure function cup w,t , not to cups.
In sum
We have derived the following readings for classifiers and measures: three glasses of wine: container: three glasses filled with wine count contents:
three portions of wine, each the contents of a glass count measure:
wine to the amount of three glassfuls mass portion:
three one glassful size portions of wine count three liters of wine: measure: wine to the amount of three liters mass portion:
three one liter size portions of wine count container: three one liter containers filled with wine count contents:
three portions of wine, each the contents of a one liter container count
Compositionality.
The above is a systematic account of the different interpretations of classifier and measure phrases and their mass-count characteristics. This becomes possible in Iceberg semantics, because the mass-count distinction does not just apply to lexical nouns, but to noun phrases in general, and because of the Head principle, which gives a compositional defini-tion of bases for complex noun phrases. Of course, anybody can postulate an uninterpreted feature system for mass-count, and extend it to complex noun phrases. But, when it comes to portion readings and Rothstein's observation about the mass nature of measure phrases, an uninterpreted feature system will be stipulative and uninsightful. As we have seen, I think Rothstein's own stipulation that derives the mass nature of measure phrases is problematic as well.
The present paper derives the mass nature of measure phrases from general principles of Iceberg semantics (bases generate bodies under sum) and from a detailed analysis of the nature of bases for measures. This account is not only non-trivial, but the argumentation involved has, I think, enormous potential for the semantics analysis of prototypical mess mass nouns as well.
The Problem of Portions.
Mountain semantics suffered from the Problem of Portions. Iceberg semantics replaces atomicity by disjointness. Removing atoms, and characterizing mass-count in terms of bases, means that the same wine can count simultaneously as mass and as count, solving the Problem of Portions:
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